




























Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Shea, N. (2013). Perception versus action: the computations may be the same but the direction of fit differs.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 228-229. 10.1017/S0140525X12002397
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
BBS Commentary on: Andy Clark, ‘Whatever Next?’ 
Word Counts 
Abstract: 61 
Main text: 994 
References: 69 
Entire text: 1,180 
Commentary Title 
Perception vs Action: The Computations May Be The Same But The Direction Of Fit Differs 
Author Information 
Nicholas Shea 
Faculty of Philosophy 
University of Oxford 
10 Merton Street 
Oxford OX1 4JJ 
UK 




Although predictive coding may offer a computational principle that unifies perception and 
action, states with different directions of fit are involved (with indicative and imperative 
contents, respectively). Predictive states are adjusted to fit the world in the course of 
perception, but in the case of action the corresponding states act as a fixed target towards which 
the agent adjusts the world. 
Main Text 
One of the central insights motivating Clark’s interest in the potential for predictive coding to 
provide a unifying computational principle is the fact that it can be the basis of effective 
algorithms in both the perceptual and motor domains (Eliasmith 2007, 380). That is surprising 
because perceptual inference in natural settings is based on a rich series of sensory inputs at all 
times, whereas a natural motor control task only specifies a final outcome.  Many variations in 
the trajectory are irrelevant to achieving the final goal (Todorov and Jordan 2002), a 
redundancy that is absent from the perceptual inference problem. Despite this disanalogy, the 
two tasks are instances of the same general mathematical problem (Todorov 2006). 
 Clark emphasises the “deep unity” between the two problems, which is justified but 
might serve to obscure an important difference. In the perceptual task a prediction error is used 
to change expectations so as to match the input whereas, as Clark notes, in the motor task the 
prediction error is used to drive motor behaviour that changes the input. In perception, 
prediction error is minimised by changing something internal (expectations) whereas in action 
prediction error is minimised by changing something external (acting on the world so as to alter 
sensory input). Although it is true in one sense that there is a common computational principle 
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that does not distinguish between perceptual and motor tasks (§1.5), we should not overlook 
the fact that those computations are deployed quite differently in the two cases. The state 
representations in the two cases have what philosophers have called different “directions of fit”. 
Motor tasks take as input goal states, which are held fixed, motor programs for the attainment 
of which are then calculated (Todorov 2004). These goal states have a world-to-mind direction 
of fit and imperative content. By contrast the state descriptions in the perceptual task 
(expectations fed back from higher levels in the processing hierarchy) are continually adjusted 
so as to match the current sensory input more closely. They display a mind-to-world direction 
of fit and have indicative content. The difference is apparent in its consequences for the 
behaviour of the organism: prediction errors in respect of indicative representations can be fully 
cancelled without the agent having to perform any action, whereas prediction errors in respect 
of imperative representations cannot be cancelled unless the agent moves in some way. 
 If these accounts are right, then the deep unity consists in the fact that both perception 
and action involve the reduction of prediction error.  However, since they do so by quite 
different means, a deep difference between perception and action remains. Some sensorimotor 
accounts of our interactions with the world do indeed serve to dissolve the boundary between 
perception and action (Hurley 1998), but the predictive coding framework on its own does 
not. (It does however undermine a clear boundary between perception and cognition.) This 
gives rise to an important question for the predictive coding programme: what determines 
whether a given prediction / expectation is given a mind-to-world direction of fit, allowing it 
to be adjusted in the light of prediction errors, and what gives other expectations a world-to-
mind functional role, such that prediction errors cause bodily movements / action? As the 
evidence for a common computational principle in perception and action mounts, the need 
becomes pressing to specify how this fundamental difference between its two modes of 
operation arises. 
 Clark goes on to consider whether an austere ‘desert landscape’ description of the 
computational processing is possible that does away with goals and reward entirely (§5.1), in 
the sense that neither are represented in the model. If action guidance requires states with a 
world-to-mind direction of fit, then states which function as goals have not been eliminated. 
Even if the difference is a matter of degree, with many cases in the middle, we are still 
operating with a continuum marked by the extent to which a state operates as a goal state at one 
end or as an indicative state at the other. 
 The distinction between indicative and imperative contents also throws light on the 
darkened room problem: why don’t agents minimise prediction error by just sitting still in a 
darkened room? If some subsystems are constrained to minimise prediction error not by 
changing expectations but by acting, then sitting still in a darkened room will be entirely 
ineffective in reducing such error signals. For example, if the there is one of these goal state 
representations for the level of sugar in the blood, when sensory feedback fails to match the 
target the agent does not have the option of reducing the error signal by changing its 
expectation; instead the agent must act so as to change the sensory feedback (i.e. to increase the 
level of sugar in the blood). This answer is complementary to Clark’s observation that some 
forms of prior expectation could lead agents to engage in exploratory actions or social play – 
the need for imperative representations is orthogonal to the distinction between exploratory 
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and exploitative actions (which can, in any event, only be drawn relative to some set of goal 
states). 
 A final observation concerns the question of whether the expectations involved in 
predictive coding calculations refer to the external world. It is sometimes suggested that 
predictions and prediction errors only concern the states of other computational elements in 
the system. Goal states are perhaps the most obvious candidate for representations that refer to 
the external world. Since the feedback to which they are compared is changed by action on the 
world, it is plausible that they come to represent the external world affairs that must be 
changed if the prediction error is to be cancelled. 
 To conclude, Clark’s persuasive case for the importance of predictive coding as a 
unifying computational principle, like any fruitful research agenda, brings new issues into focus. 
An important one is the question of what makes that computational principle operate in 
indicative (perceptual) mode in some subsystems and in imperative (action) mode in others. 
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